Clinton Administration Sharpens Focus on Settlements

The Clinton administration is directing more critical public attention toward Israel's settlement expansion policies than at any time since it came to power in 1992.

The most noteworthy example of this development was remarks made by President Bill Clinton at a December 16 White House news conference. Referring to Israel's decision to increase benefits to settlers, Clinton said, "It just stands to reason that anything that preempts the outcome [of the negotiations] . . . cannot be helpful in making peace. I don't think anything should be done that would be seen as preempting the outcome."

Asked if he viewed the settlements as an obstacle to peace, Clinton replied, "Absolutely. Absolutely."

These remarks are well within the parameters of U.S. policies articulated during the last generation. Yet the Clinton administration has never publicly suggested that settlement expansion is a factor preempting final status negotiations. Nor, until Clinton's statement, has it described settlements, even indirectly, as an "obstacle to peace." The operative phrase since the Oslo accords were initialed in September 1993 has been that settlements are a "complicating factor" in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

The most important consequence of this increased public scrutiny is that it suggests the failure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's effort to continue expanding settlements without antagonizing Washington--an understanding first reached between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and President George Bush in August 1992 and one which Netanyahu restated in his June 1996 meeting with President Clinton.

In raising the profile of its views toward the settlement policies of the Netanyahu government, the Clinton administration is responding to a number of factors:

The pervasive atmosphere of distrust that exists between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Demonstrative Israeli actions regarding settlements are viewed by the U.S. as a critical factor obstructing the forging of mutual confidence and undermining prospects to rehabilitate the political process. According to one U.S. official quoted in the Jerusalem Post on December 19, 1996, "Arafat fears that once there is a Hebron deal, Netanyahu will embark on settlement expansion. This would put the U.S. in a very difficult situation. . . . We need an avoidance of settlement activity, an avoidance of terrorism and maintenance of security, and a commitment to invigorate the peace process after Hebron by implementing Oslo."

The heightened attention that the PA is devoting to the issues of settlement expansion and land confiscation. This scrutiny, as well as the increased profile that the Netanyahu government has awarded to the issue, has precipitated a higher degree of American attention than at any time since tensions over the provision of U.S. loan guarantees to Israel during the Bush administration.

The unusual, unsolicited U.S. response to a November 26 Netanyahu visit to West Bank settlements is a case in point. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns noted, "I would say that it [settlement] is a very complicating factor.

"If you look at the potential impact on the peace process, this move today of calling for an expansion of settlements . . .
is certainly not useful and not constructive."--

An assessment that the Netanyahu government's policies on settlements can be changed in the face of intensified U.S. expressions of concern. On December 19, Israeli television reported that U.S. ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, in remarks a few days earlier at an unofficial function, warned an Israeli audience that construction at Ras al-Amud in East Jerusalem would bring Israeli-Palestinian relations to the verge of an explosion.

"The peace process," Ambassador Indyk reportedly said, "is like riding a bike: You are only steady if you move forward. Regrettably, we are now standing still. . . . I am usually an
optimist, but now I am very pessimistic with regard to the peace process."

Indyk reportedly said he sees no way out; there is total and very fundamental distrust between Netanyahu and Arafat, and the settlements are the main reason for the suspiciousness and distrust: "I understand Arafat's refusal to sign the Hebron agreement. He fears that once he does, the pressure on Israel will end. . . . From the Israeli angle, it is true that the Israeli government went the extra mile and that the prime minister would like to evacuate Hebron, but the settlements are the big obstacle preventing the process from moving on. . . ."

According to IDF Radio, Indyk's comments mirrored a message to Netanyahu from Washington "urging him to refrain from approving settlement expansion plans as a political compensation to the right wing for the evacuation of Hebron. The U.S. message stated that such construction activity is incompatible with Netanyahu's commitment to pursue the Oslo process, and that the prime minister should be consistent in his declarations."

The Netanyahu government has informed settlement representatives that it has postponed approval for new construction until after the implementation of the Hebron redeployment. And it appears that a decision has been made to freeze plans for construction for Israelis in East Jerusalem's Har Homa and Ras al-Amud areas.--

The increased attention awarded the settlement issue in the U.S. At a December 5, 1996, conference, former Secretary of State James Baker was critical of the Clinton administration's decision to "adapt its [the U.S.] well-known and long-held position that Israeli settlements on the West Bank are an obstacle to peace." He also noted that the president's national security adviser has referred to them simply only as a "complicating factor."

Baker's comments foreshadowed an extraordinary December 14 letter to Netanyahu, signed by a number of former National Security Council advisers and secretaries of state terming settlement expansion "strongly counterproductive" and calling upon the Israeli government "not to take unilateral actions that would preclude" peace. (See page 2.)

The Baker remarks and the subsequent letter were well-considered efforts to redirect a U.S. policy that the authors found inadequate. Clinton's rebuke to Israel on December 16 was, perhaps, a response to this initiative.

On December 17, Netanyahu, described as "angry and nonplussed" by Clinton's remarks, received a welcome letter of support from Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC). The authors, chairman of the respective foreign relations committees in the House of Representatives and Senate, did not refer to settlements or to the president's comments directly. Their letter was, however, a clear response to recent U.S. criticism.

"We would not presume to advise you on specific steps to take, or to refrain from taking, in your pursuit of a just and lasting peace," the letter noted.