To Our Readers
Settlement Report | Vol. 5 No. 6 | November-December 1995By Lucius D. Battle
The death by assassination of Israeli Prime Miinster Yitzhak Rabin is
being mourned by almost all Israelis, but perhaps most of all by
supporters of his diplomacy with the Palestinians. Rabin's stewardship
of this process has been critical to its success, and the complex
schedule for the implementation of Oslo II would have tested his
leadership as never before.
The key to Oslo II's success, however, is the extent to which the minimal needs of each party have been addressed and accounted for. One must assume that both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships believe that the agreement's complex mix of Israeli concessions and Palestinian achievements accomplishes this objective.
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that almost all Palestinians will answer to a soon-to-be elected Palestinian Council, there is reason to worry. Rabin's success in preserving Israel's key interests in the West Bank--maintenance of its strategic control of the area and protection of the West Bank's 150,000 Israeli settlers and settlements--has come at the expense of an agreement that ordinary Palestinians can live with.
Palestinians and Israelis alike are ambivalent about an agreement which promises each far less than what they view as their historical entitlement. As explained elsewhere in this issue, the Palestinians have managed to wrest less than 10 percent of the West Bank from Israeli control.
The point of their diplomacy, however, is not to satisfy each party's antagonistic aspirations. Instead, they have agreed to gamble that the circumscribed transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians, so painstakingly choreographed in Oslo II, will be enough to win popular Palestinian support.
It goes without saying that Rabin's successors need to be more mindful of the challenge posed by right-wing settler opponents of an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Israel's continuing settlement drive would pose a grave threat to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Ultimately a major modification of this troublesome policy will be necessary if real peace is to be achieved. It is therefore unfortunate that precisely at this moment, Washington has decided to emasculate the purpose of the loan guarantees' "settlement penalty." This penalty alone has never been sufficient to halt Israeli settlement. But it has been one continuing pressure and evidence of American disapproval. It should be enforced.
The key to Oslo II's success, however, is the extent to which the minimal needs of each party have been addressed and accounted for. One must assume that both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships believe that the agreement's complex mix of Israeli concessions and Palestinian achievements accomplishes this objective.
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that almost all Palestinians will answer to a soon-to-be elected Palestinian Council, there is reason to worry. Rabin's success in preserving Israel's key interests in the West Bank--maintenance of its strategic control of the area and protection of the West Bank's 150,000 Israeli settlers and settlements--has come at the expense of an agreement that ordinary Palestinians can live with.
Palestinians and Israelis alike are ambivalent about an agreement which promises each far less than what they view as their historical entitlement. As explained elsewhere in this issue, the Palestinians have managed to wrest less than 10 percent of the West Bank from Israeli control.
The point of their diplomacy, however, is not to satisfy each party's antagonistic aspirations. Instead, they have agreed to gamble that the circumscribed transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians, so painstakingly choreographed in Oslo II, will be enough to win popular Palestinian support.
It goes without saying that Rabin's successors need to be more mindful of the challenge posed by right-wing settler opponents of an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Israel's continuing settlement drive would pose a grave threat to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Ultimately a major modification of this troublesome policy will be necessary if real peace is to be achieved. It is therefore unfortunate that precisely at this moment, Washington has decided to emasculate the purpose of the loan guarantees' "settlement penalty." This penalty alone has never been sufficient to halt Israeli settlement. But it has been one continuing pressure and evidence of American disapproval. It should be enforced.
