The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: New Hopes and Old Realities
March 3, 2005by Gershon Baskin
Co-Director, Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Research Institute (IPCRI)
Gershon Baskin, a Co-Director of IPCRI with Hanna Siniora in Jerusalem, spoke in Washington March 2, 2005 under the auspices of the Foundation for Middle East Peace and the Middle East Institute. A summary follows:
There's a ray of hope coming through the window of opportunity, and we're waiting to see what happens when it hits the wall. I think there are reasons for optimism. But the process is quite volatile and fragile. It was encouraging that the terrorist attack last week in Tel Aviv did not derail hopes.
There's no doubt that the process will rise and fall in the coming months on the question of security. The appointment by Abu Mazen and Abu Ala of Naser Yusuf and Mohammed Dahlan within the new government of the Palestinian Authority is a sign that the PA is determined to implement the security reforms called for by the Roadmap.
The American government and others are assisting the process by supporting a pension fund for some 8,000 Palestinian senior officers and bringing in new security officers to replace the retirees. The international community is assisting the PA in the training and reorganization of the security forces.
The PA has reissued the law requires anyone holding unauthorized weapons to hand them over after a certain date, under penalty of arrest. It has declared that all security forces will be united into a single force subjected to the political authority of the Minister of Interior and led by Naser Yusuf. In 1996 Yusuf took direct action against Hamas and was subsequently retired from duty by Arafat. During the recent presidential campaign, one could see him side by side with Abu Mazen. The governments of Israel and the United States welcomed Yusuf’s appointment. Dahlan, as Minister for Civilian Affairs, will be in charge of contacts with Israel, and has met with Shimon Peres to cooperate on the disengagement plan. I believe there will be more and more such bilateral meetings.
Many think that the most difficult challenges ahead of the Palestinian Authority government are dealing with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but I think there will be a formal cease-fire agreement, difficult as that will be. The most difficult problems that Abu Mazen and Abu Ala face are within Fatah itself. There have not been elections in Fatah in sixteen years, and Fatah is split. The municipal elections that took place in Gaza, where Hamas was united with agreed lists of candidates, and Fatah candidates ran against each other demonstrated quite clearly that Fatah must reorganize itself.
Fatah is now trying to do this, but in Gaza they face very difficult challenges, where there are not only ideological divisions, but differences over who shall control various areas, and family and clan conflicts in the in the south in Khan Younis and in Rafah.
Rogue militia and individuals who have exploited the chaos over the last four and a quarter years to gain power and control present a real challenge and they will have to be dealt with. These elements have the ability to derail the process if they engage in independent attacks against Israel or against rivals in Gaza.
The PA had great difficulty appointing new ministers, because of the divisions within Fatah. After the Legislative Council failed to agree on two slates of ministers, the leadership finally offered a list of mostly little known professionals and technocrats, who were accepted, as a compromise. These are interim appointments, pending the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
On the Israeli side, we see a very intensive political debate. The Likud Central Council is trying to impose a public referendum on the prime minister with the issue of disengagement. Even if it passes in the Likud Central Committee, which it will – it has a large majority there – it won't pass through the Israeli government or Israeli Knesset. Sharon understands that those people who are calling for a referendum are only interested in postponing or preventing the disengagement from Gaza and the West Bank and that they are not really interested in the democratic process within Israel. Quite the opposite. They are interested in derailing the mechanisms of Israel’s parliamentary democracy.
There is little doubt that Sharon, whom I have opposed for years, is probably the only politician in Israel who could carry off this disengagement. For thirty-seven years, this man has been telling us that in order to have security, Israel must hold onto territory and must build settlements. Yet today he's telling us that in order to have security, we must withdraw from territory and dismantle settlements.
I'm not sure that Sharon has in fact adopted a new strategic worldview. In any case I do not believe that we have to dissect and understand what Sharon's real intentions are, because if the disengagement plan is successful, it will create a process of rolling back the occupation that will be unstoppable.
What does success mean in the current situation? On the Israeli side, it means that Sharon survives politically. The main hurdle he must cross in the next few weeks is passing the budget in Israel. If he does not succeed by the 31st of March, the government automatically falls and sixty to ninety days later we have new elections. In those elections, Netanyahu would challenge him in the Likud primaries, and Netanyahu, according to the polls, would win. Netanyahu opposes the disengagement plan and would not implement it if he were elected. But Sharon is a mastermind in politics, and I have confidence that he will get over the hurdle of the budget.
On the Palestinian side, the question of success is a bit more complicated. Success for the disengagement means that the Palestinians take effective control over the territories from which Israel withdraws. This is a very difficult task after four years of chaos. It will require unification of Palestinian security forces and making them effective. The forces are available – 20,000 or so in Gaza, and 20-30,000 in Gaza, but they must be organized.
There are also questions about what to do with the assets left behind by Israel. These are homes and economic assets, mainly the high-tech agricultural infrastructure, which produce some $300 million of annual income for Israel. This could be easily transferred to the Palestinians, if they managed to take control and continue the operations. Unfortunately the Israeli government has decided to dismantle the Erez Industrial Zone. This would eliminate 4,500 Palestinian jobs.
Whether or not the Karni Industrial Zone, also known as the Gaza international industrial estate, will attract foreign and Israeli investment depends on Israel's border policy after the disengagement. There is a need for major investment also in the infrastructure of the crossing points and the terminals. To replace sometimes arbitrary decisions of corporals guarding the checkpoints, there is a need for institutionalized, internationally accepted standards for the movement of people and goods. These are very difficult questions that have not been resolved.
There is no doubt that the government of Israel will not allow the Palestinians to control the security operations of the airport, where it will take months just to repair the damage done by Israel. Nor will the Palestinians agree to open the airport if they have to accept Israeli security controls. This presents a need and an opportunity for a third party to assist in security arrangements at the airport. A third party might also patrol the Gaza coast in place of the Israelis. Israel has indicated its willingness to cooperate with Gazan efforts to develop their offshore gas reserved. Egypt plans to deploy some 750 policemen on its side of the border and help prevent smuggling into Rafah. The question of whether Palestinians, or some international contractor will collect customs at Gaza entry points, which Israel now collects, must ultimately be resolved.
So we are observing great movement on both sides and new opportunities for reengagement. I'm convinced more than ever that this cannot be a bilateral process. The Israelis and the Palestinians are not capable of doing it by themselves. A third party must assist in bringing the sides together. The Israelis and the Palestinians have no reason to trust each other. Those who expect that the Israelis and Palestinians to come back to the table and pick up the pieces after these four bloody years are living on a different planet.
There is one exception, the water sector, where Israeli-Palestinian cooperation has remained intact, through the Joint Water Committee, thanks in large part to Alvin Newman, a USAID officer in Tel Aviv. Meeting regularly in the midst of the intifada, this committee maintained negotiated water agreements, and the Palestinians have accepted plans for a 20m cubic meter a year desalination plant in Gaza. The work of the water group illustrates the important of third party participation. I do not recommend, however, that foreign forces intervene on the ground.
Security coordination is the first and most important priority for third party participation. Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in this area during the Oslo years did not work, though there was some success in intelligence cooperation, thanks to the CIA. IPCRI has proposed to the U.S. that joint operations centers be established in Gaza and the West Bank. The U.S. might lead such an operation in Gaza with British and Egyptian involvement and a center in the West Bank, with British and Jordanian participation. The purpose would be crisis avoidance and management through Israeli and Palestinian liaison officers.
A few words about IPCRI. Since 1988 we have been a major point of policy dialogue on many subjects related to a two state peace between Israelis and Palestinians, private and official. We have been a major forum for reaching widening agreement and cooperation on a host of issues, political and functional. We have three divisions, strategic affairs, water and environment, and education.
Questions and Answers:
Q: Yasser Abd Rabbo and Yossi Beilin, who are the two heads of the Geneva Accord, are suggesting that we should jump over phase two of the Roadmap and move directly into the phase three permanent status negotiations
A: I think that the two sides need to relearn how to work together. I'm afraid that if we were to push Sharon into the position today where he would have to negotiate those final status issues, that he would not be capable at this point of reaching an agreement. I think it could create more political turmoil rather than less.
Q: Is there a new liberal leadership emerging in Israel?
A.I don’t see any great revival on the left. There is a theory that if Netanyahu wins control of the Likud, Sharon might join a more centrist party with Labor and Shinui.
Q: Is the Geneva Accord a model for peace?
A: I supported it, but it is still incomplete, and the devil is in the details. More work needs to be done. Nevertheless, it is a symbol that it is possible to deal with the main issues. At this point, I think a statement of principles that should guide a final status agreement along the lines of the Nusseibeh-Ayalon principles, would be more useful that to go immediately for the Geneva Accord plan.
The Roadmap is too ambiguous as a guide, especially the vague concept of a “provisional Palestinian state.” What would be the borders and who would determine them? What kind of sovereignty would it have? So if there was a declaration of principles on final status addressing the main core issues then it would be easier to proceed with the Road Map.
Q: Why do you think the process will be unstoppable after the withdrawal from Gaza?
A: There will be new elections and Sharon or whoever else emerged will be expected to deal with final status issues if the security situation holds and if the Palestinians show they can govern in Gaza. The Israeli public and the international community will push for a genuine two state peace with capitals in a shared Jerusalem. In the end, the deal will be something like the agreement at Taba and the Clinton parameters, with Israel’s annexation of 4-5% of the West Bank and a land swap.
Q: What about Sharon’s plans for closing off Jerusalem and expansion of Maale Adumim?
A: These plans are dangerous, and more U.S. pressure will be needed to stop them. East Jerusalem must be returned as part of the West Bank or tensions there will grow. We need to build bridges, not walls to achieve real security.
Q: How will the issue of the right of return be resolved?
A: Only a few refugees will be able to return to Israel – fewer, indeed, than we thought before the intifada, because Israelis are angry and afraid. I believe Abu Mazen, who now talks about “return to the homeland,” understands that the right of return must be exercised in the new Palestinian state, not in Israel, and the Palestinian leadership wants to reshape public opinion about this. The refugees in Lebanon are the largest humanitarian problem. Someone has suggested a creative idea of building a large new city in the West Bank for returning refugees, especially those now in Lebanon
Gershon Baskin, a Co-Director of IPCRI with Hanna Siniora in Jerusalem, spoke in Washington March 2, 2005 under the auspices of the Foundation for Middle East Peace and the Middle East Institute. A summary follows:
There's a ray of hope coming through the window of opportunity, and we're waiting to see what happens when it hits the wall. I think there are reasons for optimism. But the process is quite volatile and fragile. It was encouraging that the terrorist attack last week in Tel Aviv did not derail hopes.
There's no doubt that the process will rise and fall in the coming months on the question of security. The appointment by Abu Mazen and Abu Ala of Naser Yusuf and Mohammed Dahlan within the new government of the Palestinian Authority is a sign that the PA is determined to implement the security reforms called for by the Roadmap.
The American government and others are assisting the process by supporting a pension fund for some 8,000 Palestinian senior officers and bringing in new security officers to replace the retirees. The international community is assisting the PA in the training and reorganization of the security forces.
The PA has reissued the law requires anyone holding unauthorized weapons to hand them over after a certain date, under penalty of arrest. It has declared that all security forces will be united into a single force subjected to the political authority of the Minister of Interior and led by Naser Yusuf. In 1996 Yusuf took direct action against Hamas and was subsequently retired from duty by Arafat. During the recent presidential campaign, one could see him side by side with Abu Mazen. The governments of Israel and the United States welcomed Yusuf’s appointment. Dahlan, as Minister for Civilian Affairs, will be in charge of contacts with Israel, and has met with Shimon Peres to cooperate on the disengagement plan. I believe there will be more and more such bilateral meetings.
Many think that the most difficult challenges ahead of the Palestinian Authority government are dealing with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but I think there will be a formal cease-fire agreement, difficult as that will be. The most difficult problems that Abu Mazen and Abu Ala face are within Fatah itself. There have not been elections in Fatah in sixteen years, and Fatah is split. The municipal elections that took place in Gaza, where Hamas was united with agreed lists of candidates, and Fatah candidates ran against each other demonstrated quite clearly that Fatah must reorganize itself.
Fatah is now trying to do this, but in Gaza they face very difficult challenges, where there are not only ideological divisions, but differences over who shall control various areas, and family and clan conflicts in the in the south in Khan Younis and in Rafah.
Rogue militia and individuals who have exploited the chaos over the last four and a quarter years to gain power and control present a real challenge and they will have to be dealt with. These elements have the ability to derail the process if they engage in independent attacks against Israel or against rivals in Gaza.
The PA had great difficulty appointing new ministers, because of the divisions within Fatah. After the Legislative Council failed to agree on two slates of ministers, the leadership finally offered a list of mostly little known professionals and technocrats, who were accepted, as a compromise. These are interim appointments, pending the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
On the Israeli side, we see a very intensive political debate. The Likud Central Council is trying to impose a public referendum on the prime minister with the issue of disengagement. Even if it passes in the Likud Central Committee, which it will – it has a large majority there – it won't pass through the Israeli government or Israeli Knesset. Sharon understands that those people who are calling for a referendum are only interested in postponing or preventing the disengagement from Gaza and the West Bank and that they are not really interested in the democratic process within Israel. Quite the opposite. They are interested in derailing the mechanisms of Israel’s parliamentary democracy.
There is little doubt that Sharon, whom I have opposed for years, is probably the only politician in Israel who could carry off this disengagement. For thirty-seven years, this man has been telling us that in order to have security, Israel must hold onto territory and must build settlements. Yet today he's telling us that in order to have security, we must withdraw from territory and dismantle settlements.
I'm not sure that Sharon has in fact adopted a new strategic worldview. In any case I do not believe that we have to dissect and understand what Sharon's real intentions are, because if the disengagement plan is successful, it will create a process of rolling back the occupation that will be unstoppable.
What does success mean in the current situation? On the Israeli side, it means that Sharon survives politically. The main hurdle he must cross in the next few weeks is passing the budget in Israel. If he does not succeed by the 31st of March, the government automatically falls and sixty to ninety days later we have new elections. In those elections, Netanyahu would challenge him in the Likud primaries, and Netanyahu, according to the polls, would win. Netanyahu opposes the disengagement plan and would not implement it if he were elected. But Sharon is a mastermind in politics, and I have confidence that he will get over the hurdle of the budget.
On the Palestinian side, the question of success is a bit more complicated. Success for the disengagement means that the Palestinians take effective control over the territories from which Israel withdraws. This is a very difficult task after four years of chaos. It will require unification of Palestinian security forces and making them effective. The forces are available – 20,000 or so in Gaza, and 20-30,000 in Gaza, but they must be organized.
There are also questions about what to do with the assets left behind by Israel. These are homes and economic assets, mainly the high-tech agricultural infrastructure, which produce some $300 million of annual income for Israel. This could be easily transferred to the Palestinians, if they managed to take control and continue the operations. Unfortunately the Israeli government has decided to dismantle the Erez Industrial Zone. This would eliminate 4,500 Palestinian jobs.
Whether or not the Karni Industrial Zone, also known as the Gaza international industrial estate, will attract foreign and Israeli investment depends on Israel's border policy after the disengagement. There is a need for major investment also in the infrastructure of the crossing points and the terminals. To replace sometimes arbitrary decisions of corporals guarding the checkpoints, there is a need for institutionalized, internationally accepted standards for the movement of people and goods. These are very difficult questions that have not been resolved.
There is no doubt that the government of Israel will not allow the Palestinians to control the security operations of the airport, where it will take months just to repair the damage done by Israel. Nor will the Palestinians agree to open the airport if they have to accept Israeli security controls. This presents a need and an opportunity for a third party to assist in security arrangements at the airport. A third party might also patrol the Gaza coast in place of the Israelis. Israel has indicated its willingness to cooperate with Gazan efforts to develop their offshore gas reserved. Egypt plans to deploy some 750 policemen on its side of the border and help prevent smuggling into Rafah. The question of whether Palestinians, or some international contractor will collect customs at Gaza entry points, which Israel now collects, must ultimately be resolved.
So we are observing great movement on both sides and new opportunities for reengagement. I'm convinced more than ever that this cannot be a bilateral process. The Israelis and the Palestinians are not capable of doing it by themselves. A third party must assist in bringing the sides together. The Israelis and the Palestinians have no reason to trust each other. Those who expect that the Israelis and Palestinians to come back to the table and pick up the pieces after these four bloody years are living on a different planet.
There is one exception, the water sector, where Israeli-Palestinian cooperation has remained intact, through the Joint Water Committee, thanks in large part to Alvin Newman, a USAID officer in Tel Aviv. Meeting regularly in the midst of the intifada, this committee maintained negotiated water agreements, and the Palestinians have accepted plans for a 20m cubic meter a year desalination plant in Gaza. The work of the water group illustrates the important of third party participation. I do not recommend, however, that foreign forces intervene on the ground.
Security coordination is the first and most important priority for third party participation. Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in this area during the Oslo years did not work, though there was some success in intelligence cooperation, thanks to the CIA. IPCRI has proposed to the U.S. that joint operations centers be established in Gaza and the West Bank. The U.S. might lead such an operation in Gaza with British and Egyptian involvement and a center in the West Bank, with British and Jordanian participation. The purpose would be crisis avoidance and management through Israeli and Palestinian liaison officers.
A few words about IPCRI. Since 1988 we have been a major point of policy dialogue on many subjects related to a two state peace between Israelis and Palestinians, private and official. We have been a major forum for reaching widening agreement and cooperation on a host of issues, political and functional. We have three divisions, strategic affairs, water and environment, and education.
Questions and Answers:
Q: Yasser Abd Rabbo and Yossi Beilin, who are the two heads of the Geneva Accord, are suggesting that we should jump over phase two of the Roadmap and move directly into the phase three permanent status negotiations
A: I think that the two sides need to relearn how to work together. I'm afraid that if we were to push Sharon into the position today where he would have to negotiate those final status issues, that he would not be capable at this point of reaching an agreement. I think it could create more political turmoil rather than less.
Q: Is there a new liberal leadership emerging in Israel?
A.I don’t see any great revival on the left. There is a theory that if Netanyahu wins control of the Likud, Sharon might join a more centrist party with Labor and Shinui.
Q: Is the Geneva Accord a model for peace?
A: I supported it, but it is still incomplete, and the devil is in the details. More work needs to be done. Nevertheless, it is a symbol that it is possible to deal with the main issues. At this point, I think a statement of principles that should guide a final status agreement along the lines of the Nusseibeh-Ayalon principles, would be more useful that to go immediately for the Geneva Accord plan.
The Roadmap is too ambiguous as a guide, especially the vague concept of a “provisional Palestinian state.” What would be the borders and who would determine them? What kind of sovereignty would it have? So if there was a declaration of principles on final status addressing the main core issues then it would be easier to proceed with the Road Map.
Q: Why do you think the process will be unstoppable after the withdrawal from Gaza?
A: There will be new elections and Sharon or whoever else emerged will be expected to deal with final status issues if the security situation holds and if the Palestinians show they can govern in Gaza. The Israeli public and the international community will push for a genuine two state peace with capitals in a shared Jerusalem. In the end, the deal will be something like the agreement at Taba and the Clinton parameters, with Israel’s annexation of 4-5% of the West Bank and a land swap.
Q: What about Sharon’s plans for closing off Jerusalem and expansion of Maale Adumim?
A: These plans are dangerous, and more U.S. pressure will be needed to stop them. East Jerusalem must be returned as part of the West Bank or tensions there will grow. We need to build bridges, not walls to achieve real security.
Q: How will the issue of the right of return be resolved?
A: Only a few refugees will be able to return to Israel – fewer, indeed, than we thought before the intifada, because Israelis are angry and afraid. I believe Abu Mazen, who now talks about “return to the homeland,” understands that the right of return must be exercised in the new Palestinian state, not in Israel, and the Palestinian leadership wants to reshape public opinion about this. The refugees in Lebanon are the largest humanitarian problem. Someone has suggested a creative idea of building a large new city in the West Bank for returning refugees, especially those now in Lebanon