The Fate of the Palestinian Reform Movement
July 26, 2004Lecture by Professor Nathan Brown, George Washington University, at the Palestinian Center, Washington D.C.
In their efforts to build strong Palestinian institutions, Palestinian reformers have “laid the basis, on paper, for the most liberal legal and institutional political system in Arab history,” said Nathan Brown, professor of Political Science and International Affairs. The current turmoil within the Palestinian Authority (PA) has its roots in reformers’ efforts to implement those plans against a backdrop of continued Israeli occupation and authoritarian behavior from the Palestinian government. Although there is a growing Palestinian and international constituency for reform, institution-building plans remain stalled. The best and perhaps only hope to revive those efforts, explained Brown, is to hold elections.
Speaking during an Intern Lecture Series* entitled, “Perspectives on the Gaza Pullout” at the DC-based Palestine Center on July 26, 2004, Brown explained that the current calls for reform within President Yasser Arafat’s Fatah faction and the PA must be understood in the context of efforts to create strong Palestinian institutions during the Oslo period and the difficulties those efforts faced.
Rooted in the interim situation created by the 1993 Oslo accords, the philosophy of the institution-builders, Brown argued, was that “the time [had] come to concentrate not only on the national struggle [for independence], but to [also] focus on resuming normal political life”. These institutions were intended not to end the Israeli occupation, but to make it less relevant to the daily lives of Palestinians, to “build Palestine as best [as possible]” given that the conflict itself remained unresolved.
Brown explained that although this idea seemed unobjectionable, and indeed drew no official objections from any corner, some saw it as undermining the national struggle for independence. Brown described reformers’ attempts, in writing a constitution to “confront,” what Brown believes is a central problem in Arab governance, the domination of the executive over the entire government. Although Palestinian reformers were able to make strong provisions that would truly limit executive power, these efforts ran against the mentality that the President, as both a strong leader and a national symbol, is what keeps the Palestinian struggle together. Furthermore, there was a belief that the President’s authority as the person designated to lead the struggle should not be hamstrung in any way at a time when he will have to make difficult decisions. Brown pointed out that in a situation where national unity is perceived to matter above all else, a President whose greatest skill was “dealing with an extremely divided constituency and managing to hold it together” was protected by a sentiment that did not want to see that leadership undermined.
For Brown, the conflict between those who wanted to build accountable institutions and those who did not want to undermine the national struggle was “in a sense a clash of cultures… between the post-’94 Oslo culture and the pre-’94 PLO culture”. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)which represent a very diverse constituency of Palestinians, was an organization run very much by executive fiat. Although this culture held the PLO together and reflected a certain political logic, it was “absolutely unpalatable to Palestinian reformers,” Brown said.
By contrast, Brown noted, the constituency for reform, at least early on, was an elite constituency, consisting mostly of three groups: Intellectuals who wanted a democratic Palestine, legislators with a specific interest in limiting the President’s power, and professional non-governmental organization (NGO) activists who saw themselves “almost as an alternative Palestinian leadership… who would hold the old generation of ‘PLO hacks’ accountable.”
According to Brown, the reformers accomplished a great deal despite this clash, but most of their gains were on paper only. By 2000, there was a sense of frustration over how little had been accomplished in practical terms. Furthermore, the second intifada discredited the entire premise that Palestinians could “carve out some areas of autonomy” while the national struggle against occupation was still going on.
Reform efforts stayed dormant until 2002, when Israel’s massive reinvasion of Palestinian territories raised the specter of total collapse in the PA. This, Brown argued, heightened feelings that Palestinians “had reached a completely dead end with the old leadership and the old way of doing things.” At the same time, an international constituency for Palestinian reform developed, based on the feeling that “until [there was] a strong and authoritative Palestinian leadership, [it was impossible to] get anywhere with negotiations.” Therefore it was necessary to build institutions that could produce legitimate leaders able to carry out negotiations.
Brown argued that this growing constituency forced Arafat to implement at least a few reforms, and led to the appointment of a prime minister. However, as soon as Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas was appointed, those who worked so hard for his appointment lost interest in him. “Arafat undermined him, the Americans gave him nothing, and the Israelis stalled for time until he eventually resigned,” Brown said. This pushed reform efforts “back to square one.”
Recently, the reform banner has been picked up by a younger generation of activists, many of whom, Brown said, are involved in practices that reformers are trying to stamp out. Although this indicates a broadening of the constituency for reform, Brown argued that most of what has happened recently is merely the younger generation “using the reform issue as a stick to beat the older generation.”
Brown did not see this as a positive development. He argued that it represents a disintegration of leadership and the rise of vigilantism, the exact opposite of what the reformers want. Although he sees an impasse at present, Brown believes that reform, and with it prospects for resuming negotiations, can be brought to life again. The most hopeful proposal to do this would be an election that would produce a leadership that is “more legitimate… and able to make decisions,” Brown said.
The above text is based on remarks delivered on 26 July 2004 by Nathan Brown, George Washington University professor of Political Science and International Affairs. The speaker's views do not necessarily reflect those of The Palestine Center, the educational arm of The Jerusalem Fund. This "For the Record" may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Palestine Center.
*The Intern Lecture Series is organized every summer by The Palestine Center interns. The 2004 interns are Jon Argaman from Oberlin College, Mathew Parin from American University, and Sabeen Virani from Cornell University.
This “For the Record” summary was written by Jon Argaman.