Disengagement and the End of Israeli Occupation in the Gaza Strip
March 29, 2004An analysis by Geoffrey Aronson
(Also available in .pdf)
A paper prepared by Geoffrey Aronson for Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
Overview
This paper will address three issues related to the emerging Israeli intention to undertake a significant evacuation from the Gaza Strip and a much more restricted redeployment in the West Bank.
1. Israeli withdrawal options
Israeli redeployment options in the Gaza Strip and West Bank will be detailed and their ramifications upon Palestinian capabilities addressed.
2. Coordination issues
If Palestinians and members of the international community are to maximize the extent of Israel's disengagement form the Gaza Strip, the definition of Palestinian and international concerns arising from withdrawal and the creation of a coordinating mechanism with Israel to facilitate the transition must begin urgently.
3. Protection and utilization of settlement and related assets
If such assets are to be utilized to their fullest, provisions need to be made for their protection in the aftermath of an Israeli evacuation and their transparent distribution to Palestinians. If Palestinians are permitted to over run and destroy/loot settlements and squat on their lands, their potential added value will be severely compromised. Palestinian experience to date in apportioning residential housing assets - in donor-funded housing programs in Gaza - does not suggest that the distribution of such settlement assets will be transparent or geared towards maximizing social benefits.
Background
Not since the early days of Israeli rule in the occupied territories has an Israeli leader been able to play such a dominant role in establishing the foundations that he believes will consolidate strategic Israeli control over these areas. Israel's prime minister Ariel Sharon has succeeded in turning the geo-political map of the occupied territories to his advantage to a degree he could not have imagined when he assumed the premiership in February 2001. The basic instruments of the Oslo era - the Palestinian Authority and those areas under its nominal control - survive only as shadows of their abbreviated existence. And Yasser Arafat, the flawed symbol of Palestinian aspiration to sovereignty, has been declared persona non grata by Israel and the United States.
The destruction of the PA as an acknowledged representative institution contradicts another, more innovative aspect of Sharon's strategy - the creation of a Palestinian state as part of a long term interim arrangement, the opening chapter of which is an Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of a few West Bank settlements, the details of which are now being formalized.
Sharon's intentions are critical to explaining the perilous situation unfolding in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, illuminating not only what is transpiring today but also what he intends to establish in the months and years ahead.
The stage upon which Sharon performs has never been hospitable to solutions aimed at ending the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, nor is it completely subordinate to his intentions. Rather it has been shaped by a dynamic cycle of Israeli rule and Palestinian resistance that has characterized the occupied territories since Israel's 1967 conquest. Sharon has failed to "sear [defeat] into Palestinian consciousness," the standard set for Israeli policy towards the ongoing Palestinian rebellion by his chief of staff. He has not removed Yasser Arafat as both symbol and statesman, nor has he been able to protect Israelis from Palestinian terror. Continuing Palestinian resilience in the face of the most draconian Israeli policies in the history of its rule have forced Israelis to confront the high costs of occupation and compelled Sharon to revise his policies, if not his objectives, in the hope of removing the sense of permanent crisis that has long characterized Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Managing, Not Solving the Problem
In June 1977, then Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan explained the presumption that Israel's conflict with the Palestinians could be "solved" was fundamentally flawed.
"The question," explained Dayan, "was not, `What is the solution?' but `How do we live without a solution?'"
Sharon is a loyal heir to this heritage. He too believes that the antagonistic passions and interests driving Israel and the Palestinians cannot be permanently resolved short of the surrender of the Palestinians. Like Dayan, Sharon's actions and policies, including the "disengagement" idea, do not betray an aspiration to solve the problem - to end the conflict. Rather they are inspired by a belief in an existential, all but inexhaustible contest with the Palestinians and the Arabs generally that can at best be managed to Israel's advantage.
Sharon's proposals, explains Ha'aretz's Aluf Benn, "is not a peace plan but an update of the goals of the war against the Palestinians - and a guarantee that it will continue after the withdrawal." [Ha'aretz, December 11, 2003]
Israel's policies in the occupied territories, although guided by the unwavering strategic purpose of subordinating them to Israeli military control, have always been characterized by improvisation and adaptability. "Deciding not to decide" was the slogan adopted to describe this policy in the early years of Israeli rule. Sharon's latest ideas, including the startling decision to undertake a significant, unilateral evacuation of the Gaza Strip, are merely the latest manifestation of this trend, which promises endemic conflict and a continuing cycle of bloodshed.
"Time is on Our Side"
One of the most remarkable effects of the belated Palestinian revolt against occupation, beginning in 1988 and erupting once again in late 2000, has been its erosion of Israeli confidence in the future, symbolized most graphically by the growing intensity of the split in elite Israeli views about the proper response to the continuing Palestinian revolt.
Sharon does not share this pessimism. Like the giants in Israel's Zionist pantheon, Sharon, who counts himself as among the last of this founding generation, looks forward to a better future for Israel and Zionism. Like them he is certain that time is on Israel's side.
"History teaches us," explained Sharon at a little-reported December 9, 2003 speech before the Israel Business Council, "that since the beginning of Zionism, and even since the creation of the state, that time is on our side.... From the earliest days of the Yishuv (modern Jewish community n Palestine), when there were 56,000 Jews at the time of the Balfour Declaration, and less than 660,000 when the state was declared, we established a state in all of its glory. We also absorbed millions of immigrants and now number 5.5 million Jews....Even if the mission appears to be impossible, I am sure that even today time continues to work in our favor."
Sharon has always been confident that the management of the daily and national lives of Palestinians in the occupied territories could be married to a strategy of expanding Israeli settlement and strategic military control throughout these areas. In 1976, Sharon believed that Palestinians in territories that Israel coveted could find their political identity in Amman. He was one of the first Israeli leaders, together with Shimon Peres, to reluctantly conclude that a ersatz state called Palestine cobbled out of bits of the West Bank and Gaza Strip could preserve Israeli hegemony in these areas and square the circle created by the impending establishment of Jewish-Arab demographic parity between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
Unlike the religious partisans of Greater Israel, however, Sharon has always been a champion of the kind of pragmatism that David Ben Gurion consistently demonstrated in his diplomatic and military efforts to consolidate Jewish power in Palestine.
In Sharon's speech to the Herzliya conference in December 2003, there was no talk of Greater Israel, no claim to rule the West Bank based on God's promise to the Jewish people, no grandiose promise to end the conflict. Only the imperative of security, that illusive concept at the heart of Israel's long engagement in the occupied territories and championed by Israel's founding generation, including those, like Sharon, who have inherited its mantle.
Sharon has been thinking about the compromises made by Ben Gurion in the early moments of Israeli sovereignty. In a speech marking the first Israeli prime minister's death, Sharon, in a speech read by deputy minister Ehud Olmert, noted, "Ben Gurion's greatness was not only in his visionary rhetoric but to limit it to what was possible under the circumstances of the day. Ben Gurion said, ūLet us assume that with military means we could conquer all of Western Eretz Israel (the West Bank). Then what? We'll be one state. But that state will want to be democratic. There will be general elections. And we'll be a minority....when it was a question of all the land without a Jewish state or a Jewish state without all the land we chose a Jewish state without all the land.'" [Mid East Mirror, December 3, 2003]
Like Israel's founders, Sharon looks forward to a better future for Israel and Zionism. Like them he is certain that time is on Israel's side. Like them he has not been blinded by an ideological commitment to Greater Israel. And like them, he has always been prepared to make what he views as tactical retreats when the balance of forces dictates and to wait for another day when the equation becomes more favorable.
Sharon's plan for a unilateral evacuation from the Gaza Strip, along with the possibility of a more limited withdrawal in the West Bank, is now at the center of diplomatic attention.
Sharon's idea marks an important turning point in the history of Israeli occupation policy. Most significantly, the Gaza Strip has joined the Sinai and Golan regions as arenas where Israel is prepared to endorse evacuation of settlements and military withdrawal as a means of enhancing Israeli security while retaining overall strategic hegemony.
The plan, details of which are now being developed by a inter-ministerial team working out of Sharon's office, has supplanted the troubled Roadmap, heralded by US president George Bush less than one year ago, as the plan at the center of the diplomatic agenda.
If the Bush administration is not pleased by Sharon's successful effort to assert control of diplomacy, it is prepared to accommodate Sharon's preferences as long as they are portrayed as consistent with the "vision" of two states announced by Bush two summers ago. One could build a wall 600 km long and still have plenty of room under the tent that Bush's ambiguous sentiments in favor of a Palestinians state create. Sharon, who has long trumpeted his preference for Bush's "vision" speech rather than the Road Map with its demand to freeze settlement expansion and dismantle new settlements, can find great satisfaction in this achievement.
Basic details of Israel's vaunted "disengagement" plan have yet to be finalized, offering third parties a window of opportunity to influence the particulars, and to a lesser extent the strategic impact, of Sharon's intentions. Israel is refining its ideas with the US and Egypt rather than negotiating them with the Palestinian Authority, which Israel and the US have turned into a moribund echo of its former self. Palestinians are once again, in a manner that has not been seen since the 1980s, objects in this game, not its agents. Nevertheless, in any initiative there is opportunity not only for the protagonist but also for players like the Palestinians, Americans, the UN, Egypt, and Europeans to mold it to their own purposes. Sharon may have the reputation of a bulldozer, but his long history also suggests that he can be compelled to modify his program if those sitting across the table show as much determination as he does.
As devised by his NSC team, the goals of Sharon's disengagement plans are:
"Improvement in the security situation over the long term; prevention of a big split among the [Israeli] people; engaging international support; maintaining the Palestinian commitment to implement the first phase of the Road Map; impressing upon the Palestinian leadership a sense of the loss suffered in relation to the alternative of an agreement; engaging the cooperation (at least passive) of Jordan and Egypt; reducing the image of a withdrawal under fire; and all this at a reasonable economic price(over the long term)." [Ma'ariv, March 12, 2004]
Sharon has made an unprecedented decision to end Israel's occupation - both military and civilian -- of the Gaza Strip.
"There is no one more familiar with the Gaza Strip than I am," he told members of his Likud faction on February 23, 2004. "I have traveled its length not in a car but by foot. Over the long term I don't see that Jews can live there. All of us would like that we could be in all parts of the Land of Israel, including myself. But all those who fool themselves that under current political conditions, someone in the world, including the United States, will support such a policy is dreaming, incorrect, and mistaken." [Ha'aretz, February 24, 2004]
Like the separation barrier, the Palestinian state at the heart of Sharon's plan for disengagement is an idea that Sharon has embraced, if only in order to transform it into an instrument necessary for the implementation of his own vision.
Today, Sharon's pragmatism is expressed in a willingness to acknowledge that a policy intended to secure Israel's hold on the occupied territories may well require the complete evacuation of the Gaza Strip and some West Bank settlements, sacrificed in the face of Palestinian resistance in order to create the minimal territorial conditions for the creation of a weak Palestinian state subject to Israeli power that Palestinians, however, will have no choice but to accept. The particular circumstances in which such a state may emerge in the wake of the implementation of Sharon's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip reflect not only Sharon's preference not to enter into a political dialogue with the PA over the nature and extent of Israel's withdrawal. They also suggest an emerging Palestinian preference to accept rather than negotiate an Israeli fait accompli and to exercise Palestinian sovereignty, in the sprit of the PNC decision in 1974, on any part of Palestine from which Israel withdraws.
The emerging picture of this diplomatic landscape is one of Israel and the PLO operating in parallel universes that don't intersect, each determined to act "unilaterally" - and not to enter into a political dialogue that will necessarily result in unpalatable concessions and acknowledgments that each party prefers not to formalize. Operating with the cooperation of third parties, however, both expect that this framework will produce an outcome each can accommodate.
The coming months promise to be decisive, challenging not only Palestinians but the international community as the defining features of Sharon's map take concrete form.
Israel's Disengagement/Redeployment/Evacuation Options
The Gaza Strip Settlements - A Brief Overview
The Gaza Strip has a complement of 23 Israeli settlements, with a population reckoned between 6,000-7,800 residing in 1,500 dwelling units [Ma'ariv, March 12, 2004], and occupying 155 sq. km of Gaza's 365 sq. km [Ma'ariv February 16, 2004, others put the percentage of lands associated with Israel in Gaza at between 16-20 percent]. The settlements are located in three main areas - three settlements, Nisanit, Dugit, and Alei Sinai in the northwest corner bordering Israel; the isolated settlements of Netzarim. Kfar Darom, and Morag ranged in a north-south trajectory controlling the main Gaza route - Salaheddin Street - and enabling the division of the Strip into three sections; and the remaining settlements located along the coast in the Katif bloc north of Rafah, that serve as a physical barrier to the creation of Palestinian contiguity between Gaza city and Rafah.
The settlements have a well developed, primarily agricultural infrastructure, based upon hot house agricultural products, dependent upon foreign labor which has replaced Palestinian workers almost completely during the last decade, for export to the EU. The value of the settlements' economic production is estimated at $33[USD] million annually, $25 million from agriculture and the remainder from small-scale industry.
An infrastructure of military and related radar and communications installations complement and protect settlements. Major military deployments are located in all settlement blocs as well as along Gaza's international border with Egypt - the so-called Philadelphi corridor and one third of its coastline. In addition, a regime of maritime supervision and restriction, dating from the 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement remains in force. [see map]
West Bank Settlements - A Brief Overview
Sharon's disengagement idea concerns only a few of the more than 150 distinct civilian settlements located in the West Bank. These settlements are concentrated in the Jenin region, and include Ganim (population 170 as of January 2003) and Kadim (149), southeast of Jenin; Mevo Dotan (302) and Hermesh (234), in the Ya'abad-Arraba area and controlling the road between Jenin and the Green Line; and Sa Nur (33) and Homesh (198), controlling a main route between Jenin and Nablus.
The existence and protection of these settlements has resulted in the balkanization of Palestinian territory in the northern part of the West Bank and the interruption of normal transport, commerce, and many features of daily Palestinian life. Their evacuation does not represent the kind of conceptual/strategic thinking governing Israel's contemplated withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. It will have salutary effects on a local and perhaps regional level, but it will hardly represent a basis for sovereign, Palestinian control in the West Bank.
Ending the occupation - legal issues
Israel is the internationally recognized occupying power in the Gaza Strip, and sovereignty in vested in it and its agent the Israel Defense Forces. A separate but similar framework exists for the West Bank. If Israel decides to formally terminate its status as the occupying power in Gaza [no such move is contemplated for the West Bank at this time] and renounce the sovereignty vested in it as the occupying power, to whom does it hand over the keys?
There are three options where sovereignty could be vested: a Palestinian entity; a third party trustee; or Egypt, which administered Gaza from 1948 to 1967. Israel, at the time of this writing, tends towards Option 4- which it defines as simply renouncing its responsibilities as occupying power and its status as sovereign - and leaving the instruments of the Oslo accords, i.e. the PA in place. The continuing existence of the PA however, does not address the questions of the international legal vacuum created in the wake of an Israeli renunciation of sovereignty. Nor does it answer the more practical question of whether Israel, in the wake of a decision to implement option 4, will view the PA as the responsible "address" for the myriad issues relating to post-disengagement Gaza - from security questions to the disposition of settlement assets.
Issue to be addressed: How does Israel envision its relationship to the PA or its successor institutions after disengagement?
Withdrawal Options - Gaza Strip Territory
1. Israeli withdrawal of settlers from only the Katif bloc and the isolated settlements of Netzarim, Kfar Darom, and Morag. Maintenance of the Nisanit settlement bloc and military installations in selected settlement locations including "Philadelphi."
2. Withdrawal from Katif bloc and the three isolated settlements. Maintenance of the Nisanit settlement bloc. Remaining military deployment limited to this settlement bloc and Philadelphi.
3. Withdrawal from Katif bloc and the three isolated settlements. Maintenance of the Nisanit settlement bloc. Remaining military deployment limited to this settlement bloc only; complete evacuation of the Philadelphi corridor.
4. Complete civilian and military withdrawal from the entire Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi corridor.
5. A complete civilian and military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, with the exception of an expanded Philadelphi corridor.
These are the basic options for territorial withdrawal from the Gaza Strip now being considered by Israel. Each has its partisans and press reports from day to day announce that one or the other has been selected as the preferential option of the NSC team developing detailed planning options for presentation to the political echelon.
As the options process has unfolded, two main issues have emerged that require resolution. Each is in some respects independent of the other. The first concerns the fate of the Nisanit bloc in Gaza's northwest corner, an area that serves as the "strategic depth" for the nearby Erez industrial zone, and which has, for all practical (as opposed to legal or political) intents and purposes, been annexed to Israel. This bloc of 3 settlements has a population of 1,360 [Settlement Report, January 2004] with unfettered and secure access to Israel. It abuts the Erez industrial zone whose concerns, with a combination of Israeli and Palestinian ownership and Palestinian labor, have operated, although not without difficulty, throughout the intifada. The coastline that this settlement bloc commands is said to be important for the development of a natural gas concession off the coast.
As it considers its options, Israel must decide whether it wants to end the occupation of Gaza, establish the principle of a complete withdrawal from Palestinian areas to the June 1967 armistice lines, and implement its corollary -- a complete evacuation of all its civilian settlements, military installations, and border controls along the line shared by Gaza with Egypt.
The second issue is purely military and strategic, and it concerns the fate of Israel's deployment along the Philadelphi corridor, controlling the border between Gaza and Egypt and the Rafah crossing point. During the intifada, Israel has embarked upon a major expansion of this area, widening the corridor by destroying hundreds of Palestinian residences and erecting a well-fortified and monitored barrier constructed along the entire length of the border [to the settlements of Rafiah Yam]. If Israel is to remain in this area after a withdrawal from its settlements nearby, it intends to expand the corridor in width and extend it to the Mediterranean coast, necessitating a major, new wave of destruction of nearby Palestinian residences.[Ma'ariv, March 12, 2004]
Israel, in considering its options, must weigh the perceived security advantages of controlling Gaza's border with Egypt against the advantages of implementing a complete and total withdrawal and the related enhancement of an Egyptian security role.
Remaining in either the Nisanit bloc or Philadelphi risks undermining Sharon's intention to put an end to Gaza's occupation, and in the case of the latter, undermining the rationale for engaging Egypt in a post-evacuation security regime and undermining the strategic intent of moving the dynamic of Gaza's economic development toward Egypt and the El Arish coastal region. It is self-evident that the preferred option for all parties is full withdrawal, a scenario that will maximize the willingness and effectiveness of third party involvement.
The international community must determine how its interest in an evacuation would be affected by the implementation of any of these options. It must assess whether preferred outcomes on these issues can be facilitated or obstructed as a consequence of an Israeli dialogue with it. A direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue on the extent of Israel's withdrawal, in contrast, appears to contradict the interests of both parties.
Issues Raised as a Consequence of an Israeli Withdrawal/Redeployment ū Land, Sea, Air issues
Third parties [and the Palestinians as well] need to consider the following issues raised as a consequence of an Israeli "disengagement" in the Gaza Strip.
Land and Territory
Is there a willingness to endorse a disengagement that leaves Israeli settlements and or military forces in selected areas of the Gaza Strip?
Is there a willingness to cooperate in a situation where Israel remains in control of Gaza's international border with Egypt?
How will the international community relate to the introduction of Egypt as an element with (recognized) security responsibilities in or around the Gaza Strip?
Maritime Issues
The maritime regime currently in force off the Gaza coast dates to the May 1994 "Gaza-Jericho" agreement [see attached map] and includes ūclosed areas" to a distance of 20 miles offshore and at least 3 shore-based Israeli radar installations. It is not clear to what extent an Israeli disengagement will affect this regime, which over the years has been violated by expanded Israeli-imposed exclusion zones - see Areas K and M.
According to Palestinians, current Israeli control over maritime assets is also impacting the exploitation of natural gas fields off the Gaza shore. Exploitation of this asset will provide Palestinian with an independent means of fueling the Gaza power station, which supplies 80 per cent of the area's needs but which is dependent upon Israeli fuel shipments.
Issue to be addressed: Can Israeli security interests be successfully assured by following international conventions relating to maritime rights, which would enable sovereign Palestinian control, or will it insist on continuing existing protocols and unilaterally imposed measures? Does disengagement create an entree for either the PA or the international community to renegotiate the terms of these understandings?
Electromagnetic Sphere and Air Space
The exercise of Palestinian authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and airspace [including the now-disabled Gaza airport] in the Gaza Strip was defined and limited by the Gaza Jericho agreement. Israel intends to continue to exercise effective control in these fields, enabled by the Oslo framework, notwithstanding its disengagement.
Issue to be addressed: Does the continuation or modification of this regime need to be formalized in the aftermath f an Israeli disengagement. Can either partly act unilaterally to change or enforce it?
Land-Based Border Controls
Land-based border controls can be divided into three main elements - Border crossings from Gaza into Israel; Border security along the Israel-Gaza perimeter; and the Philadelphi corridor.
Border Crossings to Israel
There are currently crossing locations from Gaza to Israel for Palestinian individuals at Erez and for Palestinian-Israeli trade at Karni. Other crossings at Nahal Oz, Kissufim, Sufa, and Kerem Shalom are either inactive or service Israelis exclusively. Whatever evacuation option is implemented, these latter locations will probably be closed permanently.
Israel appears to favor at least a temporary continuation of the permit system for Palestinian day labor from Erez into Israel, although there is an explicit preference to prevent entry to any Palestinian labor from the occupied territories. Maintenance of this system requires close administrative liaison between Israeli and Palestinian institutions, including security elements. Trade via Karni as well as related administrative and health liaison associated with it, is expected to continue.
Safe Passage
The "safe passage" of individuals between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was enshrined in the Oslo accords. This facility never operated as stipulated and it has been moribund for some years. There is no evidence that an Israeli evacuation from Gaza will alter the status quo.
Issue to be addressed: Does an Israeli evacuation create a rationale for reopening [discussion] or expanding the Safe Passage?
Border and Related Security Issues
A complete Israeli evacuation from Gaza can eventually reduce current Israeli military deployment manpower by 75 per cent. Such savings may not be immediately available, and manpower deployments will be increased from this lower baseline if Israeli decides to remain in any Gaza military or settlement locations. For example, 5 IDF companies will be required to defend the northern settlements should they remain under Israeli control.
Current Palestinian security deployments in the Gaza Strip are limited by the Gaza-Jericho agreement [and less significantly, by the Oslo II accords]. For example, the former establishes a "security perimeter" in the Gaza Strip parallel to the "delimiting line." [see article IV Gaza Jericho agreement]. There is also a prohibition on the introduction of the armed forces of third parties [see Gaza -Jericho Article X]
An enhanced Egyptian role in border security, including the crossing point at Rafah, will necessarily depend on understandings reached between Israel and Egypt. Less certain is the prospect of any coordination, at least on a macro-policy level, with Palestinian or international [excluding the MFO] elements.
Issue to be addressed: To what extent does an Israel disengagement or a renunciation of its status as an occupying power effect the validity of the Oslo-Jericho agreement, particularly its security-related provisions?
To what extent will/should modifications of the security regime outlined in the Oslo agreements be coordinated by Palestinian elements with Israel/third parties.
Philadelphi Corridor
The disposition of the Philadelphi corridor is one of the critical defining elements of Israel's disengagement. Removing an Israeli presence from the Gaza-Egypt border, including the crossing point at Rafah, will have a profound impact on the future character of the Gaza Strip and the ease with which it interacts with the world, and establish a heretofore absent basis for an expanding Egyptian role - economic and security - in the area. An Israeli decision to remain in control of the corridor and maintain its existing supervision of Gaza's border with Egypt will significantly lessen the impact and import of other elements of the disengagement plan, effectively render stillborn a larger Egyptian role in Gaza's security and economy, and lessen third party confidence in the efficacy of committing resources to the area.
Issues to be addressed: What is the proper forum for a discussion of enhancing Egypt's role in border security? What incentives, inducement, trade-offs come into play when addressing a potential enhancement of Egypt's role in this area?
To what extent should the Multi-national Force of Observers (MFO), which supervises the demilitarization of Sinai, be involved along the Egypt-Gaza border?
Issues of sovereignty
Although beyond the scope of this inquiry, a short note is advisable regarding the intersection of sovereignty and security in the aftermath of disengagement. The importation of military materiel and the formation of alliances are two vital attributes of sovereignty, elements that are conspicuously and purposefully absent or prohibited by the Oslo agreements. To what extent, and on what basis, can Israel, after a unilateral disengagement from Gaza effectively insist on the maintenance of such restrictions?
Israel and the Provision of Services after Disengagement
Based upon press reporting and a discussion with a senior member of the Israel NSC disengagement planning team, Israel appears to be prepared to maintain the existing system of agreements and administrative practice regarding the provision of basic services to Gaza, including the commercial operations at the Karni checkpoint and industrial zone and at the Erez industrial zone. There is no official indication as to Palestinian preferences in the wake of an Israeli disengagement, although an informal survey of PA officials and Gaza businessmen, politicians, economists suggests that Palestinians favor at the very least maintaining the status quo in this regard.
Areas in which Israeli exports to Gaza can be expected to be maintained: water supply, provision of electricity and fuel for Gaza power plant, supply of gasoline/petrol for the entire Gaza consumer, commercial, and security market, and the export/import of raw materials and finished goods.
Water
The Interim Agreement stipulates that, regarding water resources, the Gaza Strip will constitute a separate water sector. Other than the small quantity that Israel undertook to sell [currently estimated at (8million c3/yr (interview)], residents of the Gaza Strip will have to meet their needs solely from resources located within its borders, i.e., they are not allowed to obtain water from the West Bank. The failure of the Interim Agreement to re-distribute the water resources shared by the West Bank and Israel prevented any "surplus" of water in the West Bank that could increase the supply of water to the Gaza Strip. As a result, the severance of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank continued, further damaging the Gaza Aquifer because of the necessity to continue the over-extraction. [Betselem, The Water Crisis in the Occupied Territories]
The settlements in the Nisanit and Katif settlement blocs are located atop the "sweetest" water contained in the Gaza Aquifer. There is some dispute about the extent to which Israel is exploiting water from these areas and some question about whether it would continue to have/claim access to this resource in the aftermath of a withdrawal.
Electricity
Eighty per cent of Gaza's electricity is generated locally, in a power plant dependent upon Israeli fuel. Another turbine is expected to come online in coming months, increasing capacity to 100 per cent of local needs.
Trade
Trade relations between Israel and the Gaza Strip are governed by a complex series of economic and administrative agreements formalized during the Oslo years, including the assessment and collection of VAT. To what extent will these remain operative in the aftermath of disengagement, particularly the creation of an export/import channel through Egypt not subject to Israeli control? Do either the PA or Israel have a legitimate basis for unilaterally altering the terms of these agreements? How will the creation of an export/import channel through Egypt independent of Israeli control affect existing economic understandings with Israel?
Disposition of Israeli Military and Civilian Assets in the Gaza Strip
This discussion will focus on issues necessary to consider when evaluating the disposition of Israeli civilian assets. The purpose of this paper is to address questions related to the disposition of settlement assets, not to quantify them. A separate study will address that concern.
Issues relating to coordination - between Israel and the PA, and with or via third parties such as the EU, UN, Quartet, World Bank, or other donor representatives - are necessarily involved in the disposition of assets, notwithstanding a principled Israeli refusal to coordinate its broad policy actions relating to disengagement with the PA or formally invest it with any residual authority.
One Israeli official involving on the planning process explained that while Israel is "not willing to negotiate [with Palestinians] on a political level... we need coordination on the ground. We may coordinate and even negotiate with Egypt, the US, and the Quartet."
There are two basic types of civilian assets associated with Israeli settlements - immovable property, principally land and permanent structures; and moveable assets, including infrastructure, commercial, industrial, and agricultural production inputs.
It may prove instructive to make a close study of the manner in which these issues were addressed in previous bilateral agreements reached between Israel and its neighbors, especially in the treaty with Egypt, which covered the disposition of Israeli assets in the Sinai, and during the Oslo period covering evacuated military assets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Territorial assets
Depending upon the evacuation option, Israel may evacuate as much as 20 per cent of the Gaza Strip. Broadly speaking, settlement planning areas comprise 54km2, of which 11.7km2 represents built-up area. This infrastructure support a population of approximately 7,000 residing in 1,500 dwelling units in 23 separate locales, representing a density of 665 people/km2. There is a well developed agricultural infrastructure, privately owned, which produces for export markets, as well as a much smaller industrial production base.
For purposes of comparison, the entire Gaza Strip covers 365km2, of which 55km2 is Palestinian built-up area. The population density among Palestinians is 25,400 people/km2, rising to 50,478/km2 in refugee camps.
Israel is currently considering a wide range of options regarding the disposition of moveable and immovable assets. These range from the repatriation or destruction of moveable assets and the destruction of all immovable assets and infrastructure to their transfer, intact, in return for compensation, to Palestinians or a third party. As Israel weighs its options, the opportunity exists for Palestinians, notwithstanding an Israeli preference not to negotiate with the PA, as well as third parties, to influence the choices Israel will make. The PA, according to one NSU official "is interested in coordination [with Israel] and smooth transition." The effective utilization of this opportunity however depends upon a Palestinian and third party determination of what their preferences are concerning the disposition of Israeli assets, and the placement of an effective security presence in evacuated assets which will assure their proper and transparent disposition. This discussion has the potential to be a dynamic one, with the preferences of each party retaining the capability to play an important role in framing the resulting options.
Israel must determine the following:
1. To decide in principle if it is prepared to leave assets intact, and under what conditions [for example, suitable remuneration]. This is a dynamic process. Israel appears to prefer handing these assets to "somebody" rather than to destroy the settlement infrastructure.[ interviews and Ma'ariv March 12, 2004] But as one Israeli official explained, "Israel will make a claim for these assets. Because if we do not get something for them, and there is no one to leave them to, perhaps we will make a decision to destroy them."
2. To determine which assets it is prepared to "sell" [for example, housing], which it wants to repatriate [for example, easily movable greenhouses and piping, pumps, industrial equipment, etc., and which it wants to destroy [military or communications installations for example]
2. To value those assets it is prepared to leave intact and to determine with which party it will negotiate remuneration. Israel could also weigh the option of unilaterally determining the value of these assets and devising a means to unilaterally collect this amount [via its collection of VAT for example.]
3. To determine to whom [the PA, a third party] it will transfer control of movable and immovable assets it chooses to leave intact. As one Israeli official remarked, "It will make our decision easier if we have someone prepared to take control" of assets. For example, it was suggested by one Israeli official considering this issue that one settlement be transferred to the ICRC for use as a medical/hospital campus. Others have suggested a role for the World Bank as trustee for evacuated assets.
Palestinians could maximize their interests if they:
1. Determine what if any Israeli civilian/military assets they would like Israel to leave intact and to value these assets, both in a strict commercial sense and in the context of the occupation.
2. Determine what monetary claims they intend to make against Israel [for deprivation of use of lands upon which settlements are located, or intifada-related destruction, for example], and determine the relationship between these claims and the value of the assets they would like Israel to leave intact. The experience of Egypt in these matters, and the treatment of such issues in the Egypt-Israel peace treaty may prove instructive.
3. Decide a preferred mechanism, or range of mechanisms - from direct dialogue to indirect discussions through a third party - for resolving these issues with Israel. For example, one Palestinian official noted that third parties could fulfill responsibilities outlined in the road map, including assembling claims against Israel for its occupation of the Gaza Strip and providing a dispute resolution mechanism.
4. Devise an effective security capability aimed at securing evacuated settlements and related areas against individual or organized efforts to unilaterally appropriate territorial and fixed assets.
Third parties could more effectively participate in the process of determining the fate of these assets if they:
1. Determine what role if any Israel and the Palestinians want them to play, as a trusted intermediary in discussions with Israel; to assist in monetary valuation of Israeli assets; in assessing the utility of assets for productive Palestinian use; and in payment/compensation issues.
2. Independently of (1) above, third parties need to decide if the territorial dimension of Israel's disengagement is significant enough to warrant a decision to engage actively in resolving issues related to evacuated settlement and related assets.
Additional considerations on the disposition of settlement and related assets
There is a vibrant if not necessarily public debate, particularly in the Gaza Strip, on the fate of settlement and related assets once they are removed from Israeli control. There are two elements to this debate, the first of which is particularly pertinent to this inquiry - 1) how to protect public and private interests in the proper and transparent disposition of these resources and 2) the need to plan and execute policies aimed at maximizing the contribution such resources can make to Gaza's economic development.
The protection of private and public interests in evacuated assets rests in the first instance on effectively securing and protecting evacuated assets. The security aspect of this challenge is addressed below. Palestinians and third parties however also need to consider the adequacy of existing legal and administrative frameworks to protect both the public interest and the interests of private parties who may have claims against these assets.
Under the Oslo agreements, Palestinian jurisdiction to Areas A and B and Gaza Strip areas was extended by agreement between the PLO and Israel. The former, through the PA, established legal, judicial, and administrative frameworks necessary to assume this responsibility. Can similar instruments simply be extended to those areas evacuated by Israel under its disengagement plan or is a new series of laws and administrative decisions required?
The question of jurisdiction is closely tied to the issue of enforcing legal protections related to both private and public interests in these assets. Whether new legislation is required or whether existing frameworks are adequate, Palestinians are concerned whether "there is anyone interested in applying the laws." (Interview)
Options for Third Party Security Intervention
The scope and effectiveness of third party security intervention is in major respects dependent upon the scale of an Israeli evacuation. For example, were Israel to remain in control of the Philadelphi corridor, and thus continue to exercise direct and ultimate supervision over the passage of goods, material and people between Gaza and Egypt, the effective contribution third parties could make in the field of Gaza's economic development would be circumscribed and the political complications associated with the continuing Israeli presence would change the nature of international security deployment. On the other hand a complete and total evacuation of Gaza that enabled freedom of movement into Egypt, opened the port and airport to commerce and travel, and which placed the territorial and fixed assets of settlements and other Israeli installations under local control would create hitherto unfulfilled opportunities for international involvement, notwithstanding the continuing occupation of the West Bank.
As third parties survey the unfolding situation, a number of considerations have to be assessed.
PA prime minister Abu Ala has noted that, "If the Israelis withdraw [from Gaza] I think we will be able to run the areas they withdraw from. What we want from [the international community], we want your support to rebuild our security.... I think we need international forces or peacekeeping forces at that time." [Ha'aretz, February 18, 2004]
Abu Ala identified two aspects of a security regime in which third parties could be involved - training and equipping local security forces and providing forces to perform unspecified security functions. The range of options in this latter field include border security at both fixed points and air, sea, and land passages, internal security, and a role in securing the territorial and fixed assets left by Israel.
Palestinian assessments of the security implications of disengagement have been compromised by the uncertainties surrounding Israeli preferences and deep skepticism about Israeli intentions. One official suggested that the road map creates a range of third party security-related responsibilities that could be implemented as part of a disengagement from Gaza and limited areas of the West Bank, including verifying an Israeli withdrawal. Other Palestinian officials are engaged in preparing a paper on third party intervention. The Olso agreements provide for the deployment of a Temporary International Force in Gaza, which to this author's best recollection, was never implemented.
There is renewed interest by the British and the United States in particular in providing training and equipment to Palestinian security forces. Some of these efforts are already underway. Less certain is both the extent to which third parties will be involved, if at all, in performing a range of security functions briefly outlined above and the mechanism through which the degree of their involvement will be negotiated. For example, the British are involved in executing a new Palestinian security plan, without direct Israeli involvement. Nevertheless Israel has noted that it is "not against it." Regarding the deployment of third party security forces, Egypt appears to be a more realistic option for Gaza than other international forces. Egypt has a long history of working with all Palestinian factions in Gaza, an operating intelligence network, and a long-term relationship between Islamists in Egypt and Hamas. Israel and the Egypt are engaged in extensive discussions about the nature of an Egyptian security presence in and around Gaza in the wake of an Israeli disengagement. Israel remains in principle opposed to discussing such matters directly with the PA but it is both negotiating and coordinating with Egypt, which, through its ongoing dialogue with all Palestinian factions, is effectively engaging Palestinians, albeit indirectly, in these deliberations. One senior Fateh official noted his concern about Egyptian involvement but acknowledged that "Egypt is concerned about its security. It has no other option than to take the risk [of increased involvement in the aftermath of an Israel disengagement]."
While Israel has noted its readiness "to coordinate and even negotiate" with third parties, including Egypt, the EU, the UN, and the Quartet, it is not clear the extent to which Israel wants to negotiate and coordinate issues of internal security with them. Israeli officials have noted their opposition to "an international force with a mandate to control the Gaza Strip on the ground." There is nonetheless a readiness to explore the expansion of an MFO mandate. [interview] There is as yet little indication of the readiness of these parties [with the exception of Egypt] to engage in these deliberations or of the parameters that would inform such discussions.
Third parties need to determine the extent of their interest in assuming security-related functions, particularly in the areas of border security, internal security, and providing physical security to settlement and related assets evacuated by Israel. There is also a need to explore the potential for modifying the MFO mandate as well as using the Temporary International Force provision outlined in the Gaza-Jericho agreement.