Beyond Gaza: Roadmap to Where?

October 19, 2005

MK Yossi Beilin and former PA Minister Yasser Abd Rabbo

The Foundation for Middle East Peace and the Middle East Institute hosted a discussion with Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abd Rabbo on October 19, 2005. The speakers outlined the necessary next steps for the Israel, Palestinian Authority and the US in reaching a peace agreement.

Speaker bios:

Yasser Abd Rabbo served as the Palestinian Authority's Minister of Information, Culture and Arts under former President Yasser Arafat.  He was a member of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid talks and helped coordinate the secret Oslo talks in 1993. He was the lead Palestinian participant in the talks that led to the formulation of the Geneva Initiative in October of 2003.

Yossi Beilin is currently leader of the Yahad party.  Dr. Beilin’s lengthy career of public service, beginning in 1984 with his appointment as Cabinet Secretary, makes him one of the most experienced politicians in Israel.  A member of Knesset for eleven years, Dr. Beilin has held ministerial positions in the governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak. Yossi Beilin is a leading proponent of the peace process with Israel’s neighbors and especially the Palestinians, identifying Israel’s national interest as being best served by achieving a fair, just, and comprehensive peace in the region.

Transcript:

On October 19, 2005, the Foundation for Middle East Peace and the Middle East Institute co-sponsored a briefing by Yossi Beilin, leader of the Meretz/Yahad party in Israel, and Yasser Abd Rabbo, former Minister of Information in the Palestinian Authority. An edited transcript of their remarks follows:

Ambassador Wilcox:  Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo are politicians in the very best sense of the word; indeed, they are statesmen.  They have served as ministers in their respective governments, led political groups, and from the very beginning, participated in Israeli-Palestinian dialogue on the unofficial and the formal level.  And they, together with other distinguished Israelis and Palestinians, two years ago created the Geneva Accord. 

I hope the Geneva Accord will someday be the basis of a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine.  It demonstrates that there is a middle ground that meets the fundamental interests of both peoples. 

Yasser Abd Rabbo:  I would like to focus on three or four key issues. 
First, nobody feels that there is an intention to continue the process of disengagement after Gaza or a willingness to address issues of the final status related to withdrawal from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, Jerusalem, settlements, and security.  That’s why we feel that the Gaza Strip may collapse if there is no comprehensive political approach towards a final settlement. 

Second, with the continuation of settlement activities, building of the wall, and closures of all kinds, we also see that the atmosphere among Palestinians, especially in the West Bank, is one of frustration, despair, and lack of confidence in the future. This leads us to conclude that we may be heading towards another round of violence. 

On the other hand, we want all parties to participate in the forthcoming elections.  Some have voiced reservations about the participation of Hamas.  We believe that excluding any faction or group would create greater danger.

The third thing is US policy. President Abu Mazen is in town, and he is going to meet President Bush and Secretary Rice.  If the message he carries back with him is limited to security, this will bring only more frustration.  There must also be a political message. 
Until now, we haven’t seen any intention by the US to move on the political front: to bring the so-called road map back to life; to help create a mechanism whereby the Quartet, which includes the U.S., the E.U., the U.N., and Russia, will be more involved in the political process and in implementing the road map; and in helping the two sides return to the negotiating table.  Two months have passed since the withdrawal from Gaza, and there are still issues that need to be resolved, like the borders with Egypt and the crossings.  Without resolving these, Gaza will stay as a prison. 

In the past two months, meetings between President Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon were suspended at least twice, and relations were frozen because of acts of violence.  Whenever a violent incident occurs, the easiest thing to do is to blame the Palestine Authority and to suspend relations. If continued, this will lead sooner or later to a total deterioration. Today we are witnessing in the West Bank a situation similar to that which had prevailed two or three years ago -- check points, closures, and collective punishment. 

So without a partnership, without a return to negotiations to bring the road map to life, I believe that little can be accomplished, even in Gaza, and the positive effect of withdrawal there will gradually disappear. 

Yossi Beilin:  Ladies and gentlemen, when we came two years ago to present the Geneva initiative to the American Administration, we met with then Secretary Powell and others from the State Department and the White House.  The first question asked by Elliot Abrams was, “Does your initiative fit with the road map?”  Of course, we said; the road map has three steps.  The first are confidence building measures, freezing of settlements and fighting terrorism.  The second is a provisional state with provisional borders.  And the third is a final status agreement.  The Geneva initiative can be part and parcel of the road map.

When Prime Minister Sharon came to President Bush with the idea of unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, President Bush’s first question was, “Does it fit the road map?”  “Of course,” Sharon said.  “The roadmap requires the freezing of settlements and I am speaking about dismantling of settlements, so actually I am filling out the map.” 

One of Abu Mazen’s first statements after becoming president was that he opposed the idea of a provisional state since he was afraid that if provisional borders would be borders forever, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would become just a border dispute rather than a national conflict. 

Okay, he was asked by the Americans, “How does it fit with the road map?”, because this is the second part of the road map.  Abbas said, “If you read the Road Map carefully, you should see that it says that there is an option for a state with provisional borders.  I, for one, don’t like this option.  So, in short, the Geneva Accord is compatible with the road map.”

But everybody knows we are going nowhere. Mahmoud Abbas speaks against terrorism, for one weapon, for democracy, for elections, all the things we like to hear. When Hamas shot a missile at their own people, Abbas was the first person to say it wasn’t Israel that did it.  Few other Palestinian leaders would have been so frank.

I predict that after the Bush-Abbas meeting they will commit themselves 100 percent to the road map. But nobody is following the road map. Neither the Americans or the Quartet are monitoring the activities of the parties. Israel is not freezing any settlements.  The Palestinians only have an internal cease fire instead of fighting terrorism. America is busy with other problems. 

The Palestinian authority is undoubtedly weak. It may be true that it is difficult, if not impossible, for it to fight against the infrastructure of terrorism, whatever that means.  So it is easier to have a cease fire and to buy off Hamas and Islamic Jihad with the only asset the Palestinian authority has, participation in the Palestinian elections and the next government. 

We Israelis also have our internal political problems that make it hard to do the right thing.  Nevertheless, it is still possible to use the unique opportunity in which Israel has withdrawn from Gaza and Abbas is committed to peace and non-violence. Are we going to miss the opportunity again? 

Looking back at the failed Camp David summit in 2000, we now see how easy it was to miss opportunities.  Today we are a little bit wiser. We understand that there was an American president and an Israeli prime minister who wanted a deal very much, and a Palestinian leader who also wanted to cut a deal.

When we read the books about Camp David, we understand how stupid we were not to use that opportunity, in believing that such opportunities always return. Still, I believe today there is such an opportunity, but I’m not sure we will use it.

So what can be done?  The best thing would be for the American president to convene another summit. He would say to both parties, “We are much more mature today.  There was Camp David, the Clinton plan, the Taba discussions, the Bush vision, the road map, and the Geneva initiative.  We know exactly where we are heading, exactly to the centimeter, to the inch.  Let’s not be stupid and wait another 10 years or 20 years with bloodshed and, God forbid, what else. Let’s cut a deal now.” 

But this will not happen, either because the President doesn’t believe that we are on the verge of a permanent agreement, or because he doesn’t want to follow the example of his predecessors, who tried and failed. There will always be people around the President who will tell him that dealing with this issue is too politically dangerous.

Now on the Israeli side, Sharon did something important.  He did not change his deep belief that it is impossible to have peace with the Palestinians, but he does believe that small things can change.  Abu Mazen would like to have a peace agreement. But we are not going to see a summit of the three leaders at a third Camp David right now. 

One option for the President tomorrow would be to adapt to the new reality.  He would refer to the withdrawal from Gaza and to the relative calm on the ground today as a partial fulfillment of the first stage of the road map, and move to the second phase or the third phase. 

Also, we should update the dates, since the road map was to begin in May 2003 and end in 2005. The obvious date for a Palestinian state should be the end of the President’s term. Until then we need to negotiate the next stages, and we need a monitoring system. Without this we will keep blaming each other, and I cannot say we are the most objective judges around.  So if we can’t have a permanent agreement now like the Geneva model, let us update the road map. 

A third option would be to drop the road map and say it has served its purpose and get back to the previously agreed legal agreement, that is the interim agreement of ‘95, amended in the Wye Agreement in ’98, calling for a third redeployment by Israel and final status negotiations.

The Oslo Agreement, the interim agreement, and the Wye Agreement were signed by both sides. The road map suspended these commitments and said forget about the further redeployment and the permanent solution.  Let’s agree on something else, a gradual process to bring us back to negotiations.  But if there is no road map, where are we? 

I’m just trying to understand what is feasible as a politician. Rather than continuing to talk about a road map that everyone is ignoring, hope that at least one of these other options could be implemented.  

Question:  It seems to me there is a culture of violence on both sides that has to be overcome if there’s ever going to be peace. 

Is there a constituency in the Palestinian movement for nonviolence?  Why has civil disobedience and nonviolence not been systematically tried when everybody knows that international public opinion is essential to win your state?  And on the Israeli side, Mr. Beilin, how sincerely do right wing elements in the Israeli government today really want to see an end to violence if that meant that the Palestinians would adopt tactics that would be very troublesome to deal with in terms of civil disobedience? 

Abd Rabbo:  Maybe there is a need to change the tactics of resistance, which are too violent and to use civil obedience methods.  Many Palestinians who advocate this.  At the beginning of this second Intifada, there was no intention to use violence.  It became a snowball, and maybe the mistake was not to try to stop the snowball from growing. Some alleged that the late Chairman Arafat called for violence or had helped expand it. I know this was not his intention.  The violence was beyond his control or anyone’s.

Polls have shown that over 70 percent of the Palestinians want continuation of the cease fire.  The same percentage of Palestinians also wants resumption of negotiations and talks.  We have polls which have shown that two-thirds of the Palestinians accept the solutions in the Geneva Accord concerning issues such as settlements and borders.

The leaders on both sides must change this culture of violence and go back to the negotiating table. We remember the famous slogan of Rabin, who said, we should work for a peaceful settlement as if there is no terrorism.  And we should fight terrorism as if there is no peace.  Any violent incident can be used as a pretext for halting talks with the Palestinian Authority, even if the Palestinian authority condemns violence and shows its readiness to work against it.

We have some weaknesses, but we cannot be overcome our problems if Israel continues to impose curfews, checkpoints, freezing movement in the West Bank, and collective punishment. It is possible to create a new atmosphere against the culture of violence.  What is lacking is political will by the Israeli leadership.

Israel withdrew from Gaza unilaterally without coordination and without negotiations. The impression is that the Israeli forces withdrew under fire.  Hamas now claims that rockets brought this withdrawal.  There was a huge banner in Gaza on the day of the withdrawal that said, “10 years of negotiations are worthless, and four years of Kasam rockets brought withdrawal.”  This helped in spreading the notion that violence works.

We wanted to negotiate and coordinate to minimize the risks, but Israel insisted on withdrawing unilaterally without negotiations and coordination. This helped to strengthen the naive notion that Israel was driven out of Lebanon and Gaza by violence.  “So let’s do the same in the West Bank,” some conclude.  

We want a solution based on negotiations because we know very well that only negotiations can solve such issues of Jerusalem and refugees. Without negotiations, we cannot end violence simply by preaching against it. 

Beilin:  There has never been a strong non-violent resistance movement among Palestinians. What is important for me is to put an end to the conflict and not to suggest to the Palestinians how to fight.  I prefer what happened three weeks ago when we had a simultaneous rally in Ramallah and in Jerusalem calling for peace, using the same slogans, and making the same speeches.  People went from one demonstration to another to speak.  This was a victory, in my view, of sanity. It showed that there are very significant groups of Israelis and Palestinians who are ready to make peace.  

Change will happen if public opinion pushes the government of today, as we pushed the government to withdraw from Lebanon and to negotiate with the other side. Eventually no government will be able to resist this.  At a certain point in 2003, people were sick and tired of the situation and wanted to go for something else.  Sharon admitted that he adopted his Gaza policy because of the Geneva initiative. 

I’m not sure whether this was Sharon’s only reason, but undoubtedly it was one reason why he decided out of the blue to withdraw from Gaza after saying a few months beforehand that he would never do this. Public opinion is crucial.  

Question:  Can you describe a strategy that would allow for a long delay until after the Israeli elections to resume peace talks, while preserving the peace movement?  

Question: Many people in the Israeli peace camp believe that Mr. Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, is the last hope to achieve peace with the Palestinians.  Do you think the peace camp on both sides is doomed forever, and that Mr. Sharon is the only Israeli leader capable of achieving a settlement with the Palestinians? 

Question:  Is there a place there for international civilians, as well as governmental systems, for monitoring? 

Abd Rabbo: Luckily all parties have discovered that there is a need for a third party at the Rafah Crossing.  I believe this shows that in all stages and in all parts of the solution, even in negotiations, there is a need for third party monitoring.

The road map was not doomed to die. What killed it was the lack of an international role to monitor the implementation of commitments in the road map. 

For example, we have an international presence with Mr. Wolfensohn supervising the economic part of the Gaza withdrawal and General Ward supervising some security issues.  But their mandate is very limited and is not part of the road map and a wider vision for a political process.

A third party role and international monitoring is essential.  And we tried in the Geneva Accord to show the importance of this. 

Concerning the peace camp, one cause for hope for us is that all the polls have shown that the positions adopted by the peace camp are being supported by the majority of people on both sides, for example, the solutions proposed by the Geneva Accord. 

Is Sharon the only option?  Withdrawal from Gaza did not change his basic intentions. His old policies are being implemented in the West Bank at an unprecedented pace -- the settlements, the wall, and the other measures. 

We think that his main aim is to cantonize the West Bank and create conditions where the only option will be a provisional Palestinian state as a long-term solution. 
We have to unite Israelis, Palestinians, and people abroad, who understand and see the dangers behind postponing a comprehensive solution. The so-called provisional solution will only continue the conflict.

Beilin:  Monitoring is offered in the road map, and should be operated by the Quartet. I’m sure that there is also room for individuals.  Objective monitoring is essential.  We didn’t have it in the Oslo process, and we should not repeat that mistake. 
As for elections, many, including people in this town, would like to see Sharon win. They will therefore not put pressure on Sharon before the elections.  It might happen only after the elections.
Will it be possible for us, for the peace camp, to fill this gap?  It is not easy, but we will try. 

The Geneva initiative was a way to fill a gap, but you cannot have a rally every day. We must find ways to preserve hope. It’s difficult for me to believe that Sharon has really changed his mind at the age of 78.  Not that it doesn’t happen. Not that it did not contribute to the process by leaving Gaza, and more so by speaking about a Palestine state and the need to withdraw and dismantled settlements.

In a way, Sharon is a change agent: Though he comes from the extreme right, he admits that the dreams of the right can never be fulfilled.  I doubt this means that he’s the one who is going to make peace with the Palestinians.  But as long as he is in power, we should give him the benefit of the doubt.  And that is why the policy of the peace camp including my party, Meretz/Yachad, is the following one. 

We believe interim unilateral solutions are wrong.  We believe a permanent agreement is feasible, and is preferred.  But we will not prevent interim agreements and positive unilateral steps if a permanent solution is not being implemented. 

I believe that Sharon is not going to take further major steps.  He’s said already that he’s not going to withdraw unilaterally from the West Bank.  He said that the next step would be a permanent agreement. But he said that he will move only if there is a fight against violence.

We should trust his words.  The fact that he has not always fulfilled his promises doesn’t mean that he is lying to us.  His view is that he sacrificed Gaza in order to stay in the West Bank. And if push comes to shove and he has to move, he will move according to his old plan of ‘82, to create some enclaves or bantustans in the West Bank so that Palestinians may call it a state. But Israel will still be in control. This is naive, stupid, and evil.  We reject it.