If it walks like a sovereign...

The incoming administration of Barack Obama has carefully guarded its intentions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet the appointment of Gen. James Jones as national security advisor offers much more than informed speculation about policies the new administration will follow. One indication of the direction Obama will take may be the assessments Jones made as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's special security envoy to the Annapolis conference in 2007.

Jones' experience since then has led him to three conclusions that will be instructive for future U.S. policymakers. First, that Hamas - not Israel - presents the most immediate, existential threat to the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, and that the most effective means of combating it is via a strategy of counter-insurgency. Second, that the model of Palestinian leadership and confrontation with Israel now evolving in Gaza is best ignored in favor of the Annapolis model, which focuses on enabling economic achievements in the West Bank and the growing effectiveness of Palestinian security forces. And third, that in any future agreement, Israel's security needs in the territories can be addressed by complete withdrawal of its forces and their replacement by third-party troops - from NATO, for example.

Without a change in attitude toward Hamas, or a dramatic revision of the assumptions underlying the Annapolis process, however, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will enjoy greater success than its predecessors. On the other hand, a sober assessment of Israel's security requirements, as completed by Jones, can provide the basis for local progress in the context of efforts to establish a new system of regional security.

Hamas and the PA today see each other as their most immediate threat, not Israel. Jones' views support and reflect this reality. Each, ironically, views Israel as a (potential) partner in the contest over Palestinian leadership. For Hamas, the dialogue being conducted with Israel in and around Gaza is dramatically different from the one in which Abbas is engaged. Both, however, have similar objectives: Hamas wants to force Israel to concede that it is its most formidable Palestinian enemy; Abbas, to convince Israel that it is its most reliable Palestinian partner.

Realpolitik, not unfocused sentiment, is driving the complex Israel-Hamas relationship - which is remarkably absent from the formulations of U.S. policymakers.

The challenge to Palestinians framed by Rice at Annapolis, and articulated by Jones, was to "follow us" - Abbas, the West and, by association, Israel - "not them," namely, Hamas. Israel, by this model, would enable modest improvements in the Palestinian economy and security forces, and thus restore Fatah's supremacy, reduce Hamas' popularity and decimate its civic and terror infrastructure. These positive developments would in turn convince Israel to expand the PA's power and functionality, reduce its own security footprint, and produce tangible diplomatic progress toward ending the occupation. Meanwhile, Gaza would experience the calamitous consequences of the policy of economic deprivation engineered by Israel and the PA, with international support, and furious Gazans would make Hamas pay for its refusal to play according to the Annapolis rules.

Jones' involvement in this policy has been central to its implementation. There have been few dissenting views about its effectiveness - one was from the World Bank, which noted last week that the policy's economic benefits on the West Bank have yet to materialize. On the security front, Israeli officials remain profoundly skeptical about significantly reducing the IDF's freedom of action throughout the West Bank, no matter how well the Palestinian security elements supported by Washington perform. Washington, though, is marching to a different drummer on this issue, confident that Israel will rethink the assessment that produced Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002 and the army's reoccupation of the entire West Bank.

Diplomatically, the return to engagement is an important achievement, but its failure is also instructive. Notwithstanding its obvious drawbacks, the Hamas model for ending occupation maintains its attraction. Hamas rule in Gaza is exhibiting undeniable characteristics of sovereignty: no settlements or permanently stationed Israeli forces, independent control over a territorially unified area, a (now expired) cease-fire with Israel, a border not under Israeli control, and the beginnings of a seaport - achievements of which Abbas can only dream. As Prime Minister Salam Fayyad warned Secretary Rice during her visit to Jenin in November, the purpose of the Annapolis process was not to beautify the occupation, but to end it.

Jones has thought deeply about constructing an architecture for peace and security after the occupation ends, settlements are evacuated, the Israeli army retreats to recognized borders, and a Palestinian state is established. In his paper to Rice, he reportedly noted with favor the possibility of employing NATO forces to secure the peace.

But time is running out for the scenario favored in Washington. Without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, there will be no peace for third-party troops to keep. As the promise of Annapolis fades, the Hamas model, for all of its weaknesses, increasingly dominates Israel's calculations. For all of its failings, Hamas is meeting the test of a liberation movement, while Abbas and his movement grow weaker, in no small measure because of their association with the policy of counter-insurgency. The road that Abbas has taken since Annapolis shows no sign that it will lead to Palestinian independence and sovereignty in an environment that enhances Israeli security.

Doing more of the same and hoping for a different outcome was Einstein's definition of insanity. It is certainly not a prescription that addresses anyone's interest, except those who profit from failure and misery.

Geoffrey Aronson is director of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, in Washington, D.C.